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Sheila Wildeman* Agonizing Identity in Mental Health Law
and Policy (Part I)
In this two-part paper, the author explores the significance of identity in mental
health law and policy In this as in other socio-legal domains, identity functions to
consolidate dissent as well as to effect social control. The author asks: where do
legal experts stand in relation to the identity categories that run so deep in this
area of law and policy? More broadly, she asks: is "mental health" working on us-
on the mental health disabled, legal scholars, all of us-in ways that are impairing
our capacity for social justice? In the first part of the paper, the author considers
the Foucauldian exhortation to undertake a "critical ontology of ourselves" and
asks what it would mean to take this curious exhortation personally, with regard
to one's mental health. In the second part, which will appear in the next issue of
the Dalhousie Law Journal, she builds out from these insights toward a political
taxonomy of mental health identities.
Dans cet article en deux parties, Iauteure examine Iimportance de Iidentite
dans les lois et les politiques en matiere de sante mentale. Dans ce domaine,
tout comme dans d'autres domaines sociojuridiques, Iidentite sert a consolider
I'opposition et a exercer un contr6le social. L'auteure demande ou se situent les
experts en droit par rapport aux categories d'identite enracinees si profondement
dans ce domaine du droit et de politiques? Plus generalement, elle veut savoir
si la sante mentale nous influence- telle - les handicapes mentaux, les juristes,
nous tous - de fagons qui nuisent a notre capacite de justice sociale? Dans la
premiere partie de Particle, I'auteure examine I'exhortation de Foucault qui nous
incite a entreprendre une , ontologie critique de nous-m~mes . Elle demande
ce que cela pourrait signifier, par rapport a la sante mentale de chacun, de
prendre personnellement cette etrange exhortation. Dans la seconde partie, qui
sera publiee dans le prochain numero du Dalhousie Law Journal, elle s'inspire
des reponses a ces questions pour s'orienter vers une taxonomie politique des
identites en sante mentale.
* Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax. Special thanks to Kim Brooks for organizing
the Identity Workshop and for editorial assistance, and for being Kim Brooks. Thanks also to the two
anonymous reviewers of this paper, and to Colin Jackson, Jarod Cedor, and the other participants in
the workshop.
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Introduction
I. Autoethnography (in a mad, mad, mad, mad world)
1. "... an expert in the area of mental health law and policy"
2. Pinned
3. Phantasms (the spectral/ between worlds)
II. Toward apolitical taxonomy ofpsychiatric subjectification
The critical ontology of ourselves must be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine,
nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it must be conceived as
an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and
the same time the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with
the possibility of going beyond them.'
What we are dealing with in this new technology of power is not exactly society (or at least
not the social body, as defined by the jurists), nor is it the individual-as-body. It is a new
body, a multiple body, a body with so many heads that, while they might not be infinite
in number, cannot necessarily be counted. Biopolitics deals with the population, with the
population as political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a
biological problem and as power's problem.
2
Introduction
Two puzzles inform my inquiry in this two-part paper. These puzzles
express different dimensions of a problem posed (or one I take to be
posed) in the work of Michel Foucault: the problem of doing critique, or
hazarding a "critical ontology of ourselves," in the thick of biopower. I
have encountered these puzzles in theory and in practice, both in my work
as a scholar in the field that is "mental health law and policy" and in the
work (or work-in-progress) that is myself
The first puzzle is a methodological one: that of reconciling recognition
of the colonization of identity-specifically, in my area of inquiry, the
apparently inexhaustible colonization of self and world by the shifting and
expanding categories of psychiatric knowledge/nosology-with the project
of identity critique registered in the still new, still resonant imperative
stated by Foucault in his reconceptualization of oppositional political
inquiry: the imperative, already cited, of undertaking a "critical ontology
1. Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in Paul Rabinow & Nikolas Rose, eds, The Essential
Foucault: Selectionsfrom The Essential Works ofFoucault, 1954 1984, translated by Catherine Porter
(amended) (New York: New Press, 1994) 43 at 56 [Foucault, "What is Englishtenment?"].
2. Michel Foucault, "17 March 1976" in Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana, eds, "'Society Must
Be Defended": Lectures at the College de France, 1975 1976, translatedby David Macey (New York:
Picador, 2003) 239 at 245.
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of ourselves." This imperative, as it is transmitted through Foucault's
life's work, is not, as I understand it, a remote or abstract one: it is a call to
bring critique so close to the bone that it pierces one's contemporary and
constructed (still raw and felt, still "personal") human soul.
Foucault's imperative embraces the riddling labours of subjecting
what is given, or what has acquired the inert and unquestioned status of
ontology-that which is fundamental to human being-to the critical and
analytical, political self-consciousness of human becoming. But how,
exactly, does one adopt the posture of critique when one is strung along
the filaments of the given; when one (one's thoughts and desires, the
thoughts and desires registered now on this page and now as I edit this
page, and again) occupies a node or perhaps multiple, interactive nodes
in the webbing of contemporary historical-political consciousness; when
one is so deeply coded and iterative as to encode even the iterative moves
of critique? For Foucault (or one of the Foucaults), the critic's trick is
genealogy: creating an oppositional consciousness through attention to
the ways that the categories through which we understand ourselves have
been created and shaped over time. The payoff, we are told, is recognition
that this rush of noise we call identity and truth is dizzyingly polyphonic
and in motion, rather than singular and unchanging. We contemplate our
radical contingency and this we may (tentatively) call our freedom. Of
course the engine of identity and truth, Foucault adds, is power. That may
subdue our celebrations somewhat.
So far we are barely striking letterA in the ABC's of critique. One may
dimly recall the point when one first encountered this sort of idea in the
Foucauldian original or in some other form. Perhaps one sensed a minor
shifting of the ground beneath one's feet, felt in a newly sensory way the
localized flow of history and power around and through one-perhaps one
was overcome by a sense of exhaustion, anticipating the Penelope-like
raveling and unraveling through which one's life course might or might
not begin to exert just a little tension, here and there, across the warp and
woof of a bigger set of stories. Or perhaps one was electrified: perhaps one
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looked down the page to the concept of "subjugated knowledges"3 and saw
in this intellectual link to the oppressed and dispossessed the possibility
of a politicized climax of critical ontology, a potential for making a direct
connection between political and social theory and the rising clamour
from the prisons, the asylums, the public housing piles. Perhaps one heard
the whisper of a kind of electrified clamour from within oneself.
The inquiry I undertake here seeks to simulate that starting-point of
critical discernment. I ask: who am I, which is to say, where do I stand
among the potent strands of psychiatric and legal knowledge and the politics
that sustain and shape that knowledge; where do I stand in the scholarly
and also the lived, embattled domain of "mental health law and policy"?
The puzzle of reconciling colonization of identity with identity critique is
inherent to this question. Of course, a similar puzzle is encountered across
the many intersecting fields of identity-based political and social inquiry.
And yet the challenges for each field, and each critical interlocutor, differ.
There is, I suspect, no general theorem to show the way forward (or back)
once we adopt the premise that the categories through which we identify
or are identified (and our responses to those categories-our variable turns
upon "the looping effects of human kinds"4) make us who or what we are.
3. I remember it as a looking down the page, but the work of critical ontology and that of
rescuing subjugated knowledge(s) are dealt with in different papers: the first in Foucault, "What is
Enlightenment?," supra note 1, and the second in Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures: Lecture One:
7 January 1976" in Colin Gordon, ed, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings,
1972 1977, translated by Colin Gordon et al (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) 78. On the latter
concept, Foucault states (at 81-82):
By subjugated knowledges I mean two things: on the one hand, I am referring to the
historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or
formal systemisation ... and which criticism-which obviously draws upon scholarship-
has been able to reveal.
On the other hand, I believe that by subjugated knowledges one should understand
something else, something which in a sense is altogether different, namely, a whole set
of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently
elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required
level of cognition or scientificity. I also believe that it is through the re-emergence of these
low-ranking knowledges, these unqualified, even directly disqualified knowledges (such
as that of the psychiatric patient, of the ill person, of the nurse, of the doctor-parallel and
marginal as they are to the knowledge of medicine-that of the delinquent, etc.), and which
involve what I would call a popular knowledge (le savoir des gens) though it is far from
being a general commonsense knowledge, but is on the contrary a particular, local, regional
knowledge, a differential knowledge incapable of unanimity and which owes its force only
to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it-that it is through
the re-appearance of this knowledge, of these local popular knowledges, these disqualified
knowledges, that criticism performs its work.
4. Ian Hacking, "The Looping Effects of Human Kinds" in Dan Sperber, David Premack & Ann
James Premack, eds, Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)
351 at 382.
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I am 46. That amounts to nothing much except that it is fixed. Moreover
it is not, I suggest, a bad age to take stock: to assemble a few of the loose
plot lines from my personal and professional life as one might follow,
with that strange mix of dejection and ambition, the cords of the various
electronic devices snaking off behind the furniture, the tangle of forces
and relationships acting in and through me as a "scholar working in the
area of mental health law and policy." It is not a bad time to consider the
political and social constitution-and the normative implications-of the
position I have staked out and am staking out in this field.
The above gesture to normative implications leads to the second
puzzle informing my reflections. Or rather, it leads to the conspicuously
normative dimension ofthe puzzle I have just expressed. Here, the question
is: what is the point of undertaking a "critical ontology of ourselves"-of
hazarding such a project in the thick of biopower? What is the point of
examining how "mental health" or "mental health identity" is acting in
and through me and through others in this field? In what sense, if any, is
this a normative project-by which I mean a moral and political project
expressive of a claim about justice?
I have already had occasion to use Ian Hacking's well-worn phrase,
"the looping effects of human kinds."5 The phrase emerged fairly early on
in Hacking's tough-minded efforts to retrofit Foucault into the philosophy
of science, and has over time come to inform multiple rich explorations
(on Hacking's part and others') of ways of being human, including ways
of being mad, under particular cultural and institutional arrangements.6
Hacking's ingenious gift has been to transmit the core of historical ontology
so meticulously and yet so accessibly: the thesis that the categories
constitutive of ways of being human are incessantly in interaction with
the human beings who interpret and misinterpret themselves under those
categories, as well as the legions of experts who refract and reinterpret both
subjects and categories along particular trajectories of knowledge. And
yet at the heart of Hacking's (and perhaps Foucault's) brilliant renderings
of historical ontology would seem to be a profoundly mechanistic social
order: a kind of inbuilt responsive regulation. That is, the metaphor
of looping effects and the work of attending to those effects over time
does not, in itself, yield much guidance with regard to whether or how
5. Ibid.
6. See, e.g., Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ian Hacking, Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality
of Transient Mental Illness (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1998).
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it is possible to activate choice and responsibility, and so the normative
dimensions of one's critical capacities. (Perhaps historical ontology does
not deem the proposition intelligible.) This two-part paper aims to conjoin
the project of critical ontology with that of normative reflection, beginning
with the localized spaces and moral intuitions of my own life and moving
gradually outward.
The normative field in which I situate my inquiry is marked by a
concern for justice, or for "social justice"-an ideal that is itself radically
open to deliberative contestation. My aim is to explore the function (and
dysfunction) of identity or specifically of "mental health identity" as it
interacts both with psychiatry and with social justice claims-making. In
this the question I pursue is: is "mental health identity" getting in the way
of our ability to do (social) justice, in and beyond the arenas of mental
health law and policy? Or if it is not simply "getting in the way"-if it
is more complicated than that, enabling this politics as well as disabling
it-then what exactly is mental health identity doing?
I ask this question of myself and across the diverse sites of what we
may call the mental health state.' I do not carve off a set domain of mental
health law and policy or restrict my inquiry to a particular institutional
or doctrinal corner of that domain. Indeed, here it is important to note
that "mental health law and policy" is not, or not exactly, a thing. The
term is sometimes used in a diffuse way, to describe any area of law or
policy viewed through a "mental health lens"; other times (more often) it
denotes a sharper, more precise site or set of sites of medico-legal conflict
exemplified by the sites of forcible injection. Thus conventional texts
and textbook chapters tend to centre upon involuntary or non-voluntary
status and interventions-so, fitness to stand trial along with mental
disorder-based excuses and dispositions in criminal law, and in non-
criminal contexts, regimes of involuntary hospitalization and treatment.
This construction of mental health law and policy around the seemingly
perennial clash of individual liberties and paternalism/police powers
reflects the central (though not exclusive) concerns of the radicalized social
movements organized in resistance to coercive psychiatry, which I take
up in the next installment of this essay. And yet "mental health law and
policy" may also or alternatively denote a far wider range of legal regimes
that do not, or do not necessarily, engage the interest in freedom from
coercive state intervention-so, anti-discrimination law, employment law,
7. On integrating into Foucauldian critique attention to both state-based and non-state norms,
coercion and discipline, see Ben Golder & Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault's Law (New York: Routledge,
2009).
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social assistance law, municipal law, residential tenancies, and so on. On
this understanding, "mental health law and policy" affects a far broader
swath of persons than those targeted for involuntary interventions: persons
whose experience of problems at work, with family, with housing, with
poverty, at some point in the course of their interactions with psychiatry
and with law come to be identified as "mental health problems."
My intent here is to frame mental health law and policy in broad
terms so as to encompass a range of sites wherein psychiatric and legal
knowledge and institutions interact with the varied constituencies of
medico-legal subjects who populate these domains. Within this broadly-
framed field of state and professional norms and practices, I ask who are
the central stakeholders-those positioned as directly affected-and how
the positioning of these stakeholders interacts with the construct of identity
or "mental health identity." I ask, too, how my own position as "an expert
in the area of mental health law and policy" is comparatively constituted.
The politics of mental health, or of mental health law and policy, is
rich territory for exploring the function of identity in social justice claims-
making. We (or more specifically, we medico-legal subjects of the global
north)8 gauge our mental health by examining the contents of our thoughts
and our feelings, our cognitive and emotional states, and comparing these
against standards of normalcy available in our culture and positioned as
the stable baseline of our identity: the strongest motifs in the stories we
tell about ourselves. Others similarly impute to us an underlying personal
identity against which the presence of mental health conditions, in the
form of marked deviations from cultural norms, may be deduced. At the
extreme obverse of mental health we may lose our capacity for identity:
our capacity to tell a coherent story of the self, to hold a stable set of values
or memories, and with this, to assert political, moral and legal agency in a
manner others recognize as legitimate.
In my inquiry into the function of identity in mental health law and
policy I try not to lose these dimensions coded and experienced as deeply
personal (or alternatively as deeply alienating: "not-myself'). Indeed, I
suggest hat the personal, as it relates to mental health identification, is a
site of significant political work. Yet my focus is on the implications of
mental health identity for social justice or social justice claims-making.
I ask: is our increasing ability to recognize ourselves and others through
8. On the rise of "global mental health" and the associated positioning of nations and citizens of
the global south as new and emerging markets for psychiatric subjectification, see Sheila Wildeman,
"Protecting Rights and Building Capacities: Challenges to Global Mental Health Policy in Light of the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities" (2013) 41:1 JL Med& Ethics 48 at 50.
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the categories of mental health disabling our capacity to recognize social
injustice? Nikolas Rose has argued that psychiatric knowledge is in
incessant interaction with the "autonomiz[ing]" and "responsibliz ing]"
forces of neo-liberal political economy.9 This is to suggest that our
experience of self and world through the construct of mental health identity
may operate to channel our analysis of social and institutional problems
(e.g., self-harm and violence in prisons, poverty, homelessness) to the
narrow and manipulable sites of mental dysfunction: individual broken
brains. This is part of what I am concerned with in asking whether mental
health identity or identification is "getting in the way."
And yet my inquiry into the field of mental health politics is concerned
not only with mental health consumerism, expressive of the joint energies
of neo-liberal political economy and psycho-pharmaceutical market
expansion, but also with what would seem the opposite pole of this
politics: the phenomenon of radicalized psy-subjects actively organizing
in resistance to psychiatric subjectification and coercion. Are such radical
projects, too-perhaps through the very act of solidarity-building around
politicized or radicalized mental health identities-"getting in the way"
of social justice? Here I seek to take seriously the post-identity critique
of identity politics, i.e., the critique that deployment of a (vulnerable,
derided) group identity for the purpose of social justice claims-making
may paradoxically reify social-structural patterns of domination and
oppression, impair recognition and representation of diversity among
putative group members, and obstruct the work of social justice movement-
building beyond a highly localized micropolitics. I ask: do these criticisms
have any purchase on the radicalized politics of mental health?
It is in light of this complex interweaving of identity and identity
critique in the domain of mental health politics that I wish to revive
or revisit Foucault's exhortation to attempt the "critical ontology of
ourselves": to call ourselves, the very conditions of possibility of our
"selves," into question through historically- and institutionally-grounded
attention to what makes our ways of being human (of being mad, of being
political) possible. The point of the exercise is not to suggest that we
could or should ever wholly get past mental health identification in our
politics or our laws. Rather, the point (or aspiration) of critical ontology
and the related work of "agonizing identity"-at least, the point of my
engaging with these constructs here-is to become, or to keep striving to
become, better equipped to assess the legitimacy of the norms clustered
9. Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Jtself Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-
First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) at 4.
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under the descriptor "mental health law and policy." Perhaps, too, ever so
tentatively, we might begin to imagine alternative ways of organizing the
conceptual and institutional bases for distributing power in and beyond the
mental health state.
The first part of this two-part paper broaches the question of identity
in mental health law and policy through the method of auto-ethnography,
and so with reference to my own participation in (and alienation from)
the discourse of mental health. I explore, in light of a few fragments from
my narratives of self, some of the ways that my identity as a participant
in this field is refracted not merely through the categories of psychiatry
but through a range of symbolic and cultural, personal referents and
relationships that condition the possibilities for my negotiating mental
health identification or non-identification.
The second part, which will be printed in the Spring 2016 volume of
the Dalhousie Law Journal, builds from these efforts at auto-ethnography
to construct what I am calling a political taxonomy of mental health
identities, or a political taxonomy of psychiatric subjectification. I
distinguish three main categories of identity or identification that I suggest
assist in illuminating the complexities of social justice claims-making in
the politics of mental health:
1. the category of radicalized psy-subjects (including users and
survivors of psychiatry, Mad Pride, and antipsychiatry-
constituencies that, in different ways, seek to resist the imbrication
of psychiatric knowledge and services with societal oppression
and state-backed coercion);
2. the category of mental health consumers (an overarching term
for a diverse constituency focused in the main on attaining or
improving access to services); and
3. the category of liminal psy-subjects, encompassing the suggestible
(those standing at the threshold of psychiatric subjectification) and
the spectral (a term I use to describe a transitory state, latent in us
all, wherein identity may be contemplated in light of its historical
and material bases and yet appreciated as lacking in substance, as
phantasmic).
I interject episodically throughout Part II to ask where I stand, so rendering
my putatively neutral expert status vulnerable to the competing allegiances
and priorities of oppositional, pliant, and liminal psychiatric subjects. Part
II, like Part I, thus aims to convey an acute self-awareness of its own (my
own) artifice or constructedness.
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By the end of the two pieces, I hope to have shown that the critical
ontology of ourselves requires a special kind of agonizing. By this I mean
to signal a shift from the solitary labours associated with the critical-
historical ontologist (who, master detective like, retraces the steps of
human becoming by way of evidence on the public record) to a more self-
consciously political work done in concert with contemporaneous others.
The agonizing I have in mind draws on Chantal Mouffe's "agonistic
pluralism,"1 wherein conflict or contestation is positioned as the defining
feature of politics. Mouffe's work is informed by the Schmittian insight
that "the identity of a democratic political community"-and with this, the
possibility of democratic rights of citizenship-"hinges on the possibility
of drawing a frontier between the 'us' and the 'them.' 11 Yet Mouffe's
theorization of radical pluralist politics rejects Schmitt's idealized
expression of the political in the form of a homogeneous identitarian
state,12 just as it rejects the competing liberal ideal of resolving pluralism
in untroubled consensus through the unitary construct of reason. 13 Against
both alternatives, agonistic pluralism promotes an ethic of incessant
interrogation of constitutive exclusion: a hyper-awareness of the violence
of othering implicit in identity and in politics. In this way, agonism may
be understood as a necessary feature of the aspiration toward inclusion
or inclusive deliberation. Or this is how I use the term here: as a critical
reminder of and rejoinder to the cognitive and social processes productive
of exclusion, and in this sense a condition precedent o political legitimacy
or to the ongoing effort (never fully realized) to build understanding and
public justification across difference. Anyhow it suits me, this agonizing,
as it conveys the deep discomfort or angst hat comes of self-alienating
reflection on one's own (my own) and others' mental health-and so on
10. Chantal Mouffe, "For an Agonistic Model of Democracy" in Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic
Paradox (New York: Verso, 2005) 80 at 101-103. See also Chantal Mouffe, "Carl Schmitt and the
Paradox of Liberal Democracy" in David Dyzenhaus, ed, Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt s Critique of
Liberalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998) 159 at 167-168 [Mouffe, "Carl Schmitt"],
where Mouffe writes:
Consensus in a liberal-democratic society is-and will always be-the expression of a
hegemony and the crystallization of relations of power. The frontier that it establishes
between what is and what is not legitimate is a political one and for that reason it should
remain contestable. To deny the existence of such a moment of closure or to present the
frontier as dictated by rationality or morality is to naturalize what should be perceived as a
contingent and temporary hegemonic articulation of the people through a particular regime
of inclusion/exclusion. The result of such an operation is to reify the identity of the people
by reducing it to one of its many possible forms of identification.
11. Ibid at 164. In this section of her essay, Mouffe is primarily engaged with interpretation of
Schmitt's The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).
12. Mouffe, "Carl Schmitt," supra note 10 at 171-174.
13. Ibid at 167-168, 173.
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mental health identity as a constitutive feature of "mental health law and
policy."
I. Autoethnography14 (in a mad, mad, mad, mad world)
1. ... an expert in the area of mental health law and policy"
My research in the area of mental health law and policy-published and
(far more voluminously) unpublished-has been mostly preoccupied with
laws and medico-legal practices relating to decision-making capacity. I
have focused primarily on capacity to make decisions about medical
treatment, and more narrowly still, on the institutional arenas in which
this capacity is determined as a criterion of, or alternatively a status
supplementary to, involuntary psychiatric hospitalization.
My interest in legal capacity traces back to 2002, when I assembled
a doctoral research proposal that contemplated taking a grounded theory
approach to interviews I was determined to do with participants in Ontario
Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) hearings. I was particularly concerned
to speak with persons who had been subject to hearings in which their
capacity to make treatment decisions had been in issue: both those who
had successfully overturned a psychiatrist's declaration of incapacity and
those who had failed to overturn the declaration. My aim was to bring the
perspectives ofthese individuals on the facts and values of central relevance
to the dispute into relationship with the perspectives of professional and
familial participants, and then, ultimately, to assess whether or how these
various perspectives were reflected in the reasons for decision. I spent
about eight months sifting through CCB decisions while seeking allies to
assist in my war with the University of Toronto's research ethics board
(REB).
My disagreement with the REB turned on how to obtain consent to
participate where a proposed interview subject had been deemed incapable
of making decisions about some form of treatment. In successive rounds
of correspondence, the REB insisted that my access to such individuals
should be contingent on consent from the substitute decision-maker
for treatment. This was inconsistent with the governing law in Ontario
14. See Carolyn Ellis, Tony E Adams & Arthur P Bochner, "Autoethnography: An Overview,"
online: (2011) 12:1 Forum: Qualitative Social Research 10 at 1 <www.qualitative-research.net>
[citations omitted]:
Autoethnography is an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and
systematically analyze (graphy) personal experience (auto) in order to understand
cultural experience (ethno). This approach challenges canonical ways of doing research
and representing others and treats research as a political, socially-just and socially-
conscious act. A researcher uses tenets of autobiography and ethnography to do and write
autoethnography. Thus, as a method, autoethnography is both process and product.
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which strictly circumscribed the authority of those appointed to make
treatment decisions. Moreover, it was inconsistent with the fundamental
premise of my inquiry- i.e., that the legal arenas for disputing decision-
making capacity should be critically appraised in a manner sensitive
to the operation of familial and professional power, and with this, the
potential for silencing or marginalizing the perspectives of those seeking
to vindicate their legal capacity. Finally, it was unworkable for pragmatic
reasons, as the mental health bar in Toronto had been very clear that they
would advise their clients not to participate in my study should consent of
the substitute decision-maker for treatment be required.
In a final round of correspondence, the REB admitted the impropriety
of requiring substitute consent from the decision-maker for treatment. Its
final position, however, was that my access to persons deemed incapable
of certain treatment decisions would be contingent on my obtaining from
the treating psychiatrist a positive opinion about the individual's capacity
to consent to an interview about the CCB process. Here my response was
perhaps more controversial. In answer to the REB's concern that I not
serve as the arbiter of capacity to consent to my research, I had earlier
proposed that a mental health professional experienced in assessing
decision-making capacity accompany me in the interviews, to watch for
signs of lack of understanding or appreciation of the goals and risks of
research participation, and, where appropriate, to attempt to better convey
that information and assess for inability to process it. I acknowledge that
this was itself arguably an insulting and dignity-infringing proposal. At
the time, I felt it would be possible to bring on an occupational therapist or
other who was sensitive to the issues, including the equality principles, at
stake. In any case, this was in my view a preferable alternative to the REB's
proposal, whereby involvement in my research would be contingent on a
capacity determination by a psychiatric professional ikely to be centrally
involved in the wider dispute about treatment incapacity.
This final standoff marked the end of my idealized research project
intended to expose the perspectival construction of decision-making
capacity. On reflection, the fundamental problem with my proposal was
perhaps something that the REB did not appear, on the surface, to be
concerned about. That is, the fundamental problem-for all my tentative
efforts to shape the project through consultation with the mental health bar
and various experts in research design-was my basic undeservingness of
trust. I was seeking entry into a complex and highly contested field with very
little understanding of the context and of what was at stake for the maj or
players. My research questions reflected a rough theoretical framework
of relational autonomy and the need to align capacity determination with
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liberal legalism's deep commitment to value pluralism. But I had no clear
conception of how my project linked up with the aspirations of others
in this field. My proposal was both naive and overly reliant on expert
(or wanna-be-expert) authority. However, the REB's handling of it still
rankles.
My research on questions of capacity and psychiatric treatment since
then has drawn not on conversations with living, affected, people, but
rather on legal decisions, medico-legal texts, to some extent philosophy
of psychiatry and, to an even more limited extent, autobiography. At some
point I hitched my wagon to a team investigating the public's (or various
subsets of the Canadian public's) knowledge and opinions about the state
of the law on substitute consent to research. That project refrained from
engagement with persons deemed incapable of research participation; the
obstacles to REB approval were so clear that this was not even proposed.
More recently, I returned to the questions that brought me to mental health
law and policy in a paper addressing tensions between expert knowledge-
represented by global mental health policy unfolding at and beyond
the World Health Organization (WHO)-and dissenting perspectives
advanced by Disabled Persons Organizations during the negotiation
and implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities.15
However, somewhere along my academic trajectory I lost the central
threads that might have linked the start of my journey to where I am now.
I refer to the deep ambitions of my proposed doctoral research, its concern
to track the phenomenon whereby the testimony of individuals undergoing
capacity assessment is translated from reason to symptom. My imagined
dissertation ended its life as a tangle of crisscrossing ideas, overlapping
textures spanning a decade and more and then disappearing in various
directions, all in the effort to produce an insight or two worth retaining
on the value-laden and politically volatile category of capacity to make
treatment decisions, along with its shadowy companion, "insight." The
thesis lies dormant in a collection of crackling and jostling electronic files.
All this takes me squarely into the contested territory sketched in my
introduction, and so to the question: who am I, and where do I stand in
the arenas of mental health law and policy? My work on capacity and
psychiatric treatment strains toward a unified message-namely, that
we must work harder to create the structural conditions, the social and
institutional and conceptual supports, to assist in disrupting the hegemony
15. 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force on 3 May 2008). See Wildeman, supra
note 8.
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of the individualizing and responsibilizing, punishing, silencing models
of "mental health" and "mental illness" that too often are determinative
of legal dispositions affecting fundamental rights. But that message is
delivered from a nowhere-land, as if written by an invisible hand. Where
am I situated among the competing perspectives that co-constitute the sites
of mental health law and policy, the sites I scrutinize with such interest?
Let me say just a little more about how this question comes up in
my daily life. I sit on the volunteer board of the Canadian Mental Health
Association, Nova Scotia Division (CMHA-NS). That organization's
origins reach back to the mental hygiene movement, which in Nova Scotia
took on such social purification missions as screening new immigrants and
schoolchildren for mental health problems for the purposes of exclusion
or "special" treatment-"special" homes, "special" classes, "special"
education.16 However, its mandate evolved over time from a protective
one to one dedicated, in significant part, to creating spaces for enhanced
peer support and what is now termed first voice advocacy." Thus while
not a "consumer-" or "survivor-" led organization (terms I take up in some
detail in Part II), CMHA-NS has come to identify as (indeed to brand
itself as) inclusive of and guided by the perspectives of persons who are
experiencing or who have experienced mental health problems. In this,
CMHA-NS may be distinguished from, for instance, the family-centred
perspectives of the Schizophrenia Society.18 In constituting the CMHA-NS
board, we thus tend to (though we are not formally mandated to) consider
the diversity of perspectives represented. I am identified as a legal expert.
At this time,just one of our eight directors actively identifies as contributing
a first voice perspective. Others are generally understood as allies: helping
professionals, financial professionals, business professionals active in
promoting mental health in and beyond the workplace. My identification
as mental health-affected, or not, has never really come up.
Other arenas of mental health law and policy in Nova Scotia call for
more formal self-identification. For instance, the province's Involuntary
Psychiatric Treatment Act mandates that review of involuntary
hospitalization and treatment be conducted by tripartite panels consisting
of a psychiatrist, a lawyer ("who express[es] an interest in mental health
16. Canadian Mental Health Association, "History of CMHA" (CMHA), online: <www.cmha.cal
about-cmha/history-of-cmha>.
17. See Judith Fingard & John Rutherford, Protect, Befriend, Respect: Nova Scotia ' Mental Health
Movement, 1908 2008 (Black Point, NS: Femwood, 2008).
18. Ibid.
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issues") and a layperson.19 The third category is more fully described in
section 65(2)(c) as follows:
[P]ersons who do not meet the criteria of clauses (a) and (b) [i.e., not
a psychiatrist or lawyer] and who express an interest in mental health




Thus Nova Scotia inscribes the category of mental health "consumer" into
its laws on the oversight of legally-sanctioned psychiatric force. What are
the implications of this? So far, I have turned the "who am I?" question
on myself But this is something I cannot answer except in relation to
where others in the field of mental health law and policy stand. Who are
these representative consumers? What, if anything, defines the coherence
of the consumer perspective, the consumer "identity," or "experience?"
What are the characteristics-or perhaps most importantly, the ideological
positions or analyses-of those occupying such legally constituted spaces
for mental health identity, putatively functioning to legitimate coercion?
As one who is classed as a legal expert-and moreover, one who takes
no psychiatric medications, attends no regular meetings with psychiatric
professionals, and does not identify (at least, not publicly, or with
certainty) as mental health-affected, disordered, or disabled-I would not
consider applying for the position carved out by section 65(2)(c) of the
Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act. Of course, the criteria for tribunal
membership do not rule out the possibility that persons occupying the role
of psychiatrist or lawyer may draw upon insights gained as "a consumer
of mental health services," or otherwise proceeding from personal
experiences one is comfortable packaging in the discourse of mental
health. Yet the fundamental question remains: what does one bring to the
work of judgment, of sorting and prioritizing the facts and values placed
in issue before such a tribunal in its mandate of overseeing psychiatric
coercion? It is a question of where one stands-a question that, unstated if
not stated, affects the credibility and authority of all those who participate
in the arenas of mental health law and policy, including those who assume
the ostensibly neutral status of experts.
2. Pinned
A few years ago, in a medical consultation framed around my persistent
worries about memory loss, my family doctor speculated aloud as to
whether the problem might be ADHD. I was taken aback; perhaps a little
19. Involuntary Psychiatric TreatmentAct, SNS 2005, c 42, s 65(2).
20. Ibid, s 65(2)(c).
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bemused. If anything, I suggested, I am too on-task. I have a tendency to
indulge in footnotes that expand to the status of novellas; distractibility
is the least of my problems. But what if that tunnel vision, she gently
persisted, is itself an expression of ADHD? I was doubtful. Appalled,
even. (If I am to get a diagnosis, can't it be something romantic or at least
vaguely interesting-something that does not reduce my self-image to that
of a squirmy six-year-old boy?) But I was also a little curious. Perhaps a
little desperate. At that point, I was in the final throes of the tragic (for me)
abandonment of my doctoral dissertation. My doctor got down to brass
tacks: "This is how it works. If the pills help you stay on task and complete
the task, then you have ADHD. If they rev you up [she said something
like that; I don't remember exactly what she said-did I mention memory
problems?] then you don't have it."
I respect my doctor. She saw me through two pregnancies and various
run-of-the-mill matters involving my health and that of my two boys.
But this was something new. Was she messing with my mind? More
concerningly, was there something beyond our two-minute conversation,
some telltale symptom I had betrayed over the years, without my knowing?
Had I-as I so frequently do, in writing and in speech-interrupted my
train of thought overmuch, as if overcome by the force of the incoming
train? Had I failed to conceal that thing I do with my hands, that excited
clawing flapping tensing-up thing that no one, not even (indeed especially
not) my spouse or kids, should ever see?21 Am I doing that thing all the
time? I want to do it right now. I wanted to do it as I sat across from my
doctor, meeting her gaze. Could she tell?
I walked out and pretty much forgot he whole conversation.
Fast-forward to a few years later; indeed, just a few weeks ago. I was
back in her office-my doctor's-worrying about my bad memory. I had
finally summoned the courage to consult a neurologist (the first time I
was put on a months-long referral list and then backed out just before
the appointment). He and I had had a brief but oddly satisfying chat. He
did not appear to be familiar with my file. He was not much interested
in my family history. It appeared that my "high functioning" as a law
professor, in addition to a few taps on the knee and follow-the-finger
trials, was sufficient to disclaim my memory-related anxieties. These
anxieties and the problems fueling them were symptomatic, he said-to
his young, obviously extremely bored, resident-of my overtaxed familial
21. One time my mother caught me doing the thing down in the laundry room, when I was about
12. I will never forget the utter shame of it. Only she can make fun of the thing-she does a wicked
impression.
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and professional life. Perhaps my situation shaded into one or another
diagnostic category (bipolar? I suggested); likely not bipolar, more
likely ADHD-most probably ADHD, he said, making a few stabs in his
notebook-but this was not a neurological problem and not something I
should worry about.
So there I was, back with my family doctor for the obligatory post-
referral consult. A complete waste of time and tax dollars. I archly informed
her of my diagnosis: modem life! She turned the discussion rather deftly
to ADHD.
This time, she had backup. She handed me the Adult ADHD Self-
Report Scale (ASRS-vI.I) Symptom Checklist.22 The cover sheet states
that the checklist was designed to be consistent with DSM-IV, and was
"developed in conjunction with the World Health Organization (WHO)
and the Workgroup on Adult ADHD." The cover also provides a concise
rationale for use of the checklist:
Research suggests that the symptoms of ADHD can persist into
adulthood, having a significant impact on the relationships, careers, and
even the personal safety of your patients who may suffer from it. Because
this disorder is often misunderstood, many people who have it do not
receive appropriate treatment and, as a result, may never reach their
full potential. Part of the problem is that it can be difficult to diagnose,
particularly in adults.23
The checklist comprised 18 brief questions, on one side of a page. The first
was ominous: "How often do you have trouble wrapping up the final details
of a project, once the challenging parts have been done?"24 I suppose that
depends on your definition of "challenging" and "final details," I thought.
I recalled my disastrous dissertation; also my ancient draft of "Paradise
Law," a pulsating tome on John Milton and the Ancient Constitution that I
meant to dig up and sort out and mail out years ago. And the like: buried,
blasted things. I checked: "Often." I wondered, what happens if I fail to
finish the checklist?
"How often do you fidget or squirm with your hands or feet when
you have to sit down for a long time?"25 Aha. I began to worry that the
checklist would ask about the thing.
22. World Health Organization & Workgroup on Adult ADHD, "Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale
(ASRS-vl. 1) Symptom Checklist, online: National Resource Center on AD/HD <www.help4adhd.
org/documents/adultadhdselfreportscale-asrs-v 1- 1.pdf>.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid [emphasis added].
25. Ibid [emphasis added].
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It took less than a minute to complete. I passed it over and about 3
seconds later the diagnosis was in. Typically, my doctor added, adults are
diagnosed when their children are diagnosed. "There is a strong genetic
component," she said. It was quite likely that one or both boys had it.
That was the only point in the exchange at which I felt angry, in that
sudden way one gets angry when one's children are wronged.
Again, I left without a prescription. But this time I found the
conversation harder to forget.
Mine is not an unusual story. Many of us are familiar with the
staggering rise in ADHD diagnoses in children over the past few decades
in the U.S. and Canada. A study recently published in the Journal of the
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, drawing on data
from the National Survey of Children's Health for the period 2003-2011,
found a 42 per cent increase in parent-reported diagnoses of the disorder
over that period.26 In 2011-2012, 11 per cent of children aged 4-17
were reported by their parents as having been diagnosed with ADHD.
27
The same study found that the proportion of ADHD-diagnosed children
receiving ADHD medication had also increased, by as much as 28 per
cent since 2007-2008.2' These findings are supported by other prevalence
studies over the past decade.29
The adults, it turns out, are lagging behind-but efforts are being
made to help us catch up. According to a study published in 2011 reporting
on a retrospective analysis of 342,284 insured, employed individuals in
the U.S. and their families, diagnoses of adult ADHD rose more than
threefold between 2002 and 2007 (1.23 to 4.02 cases per 1000 insured
members).3" The study authors suggest that the results "may underestimate
the true prevalence of diagnosed ADHD in the [U.S.] population," given
the restriction of the data set to employed persons and their dependents.31
26. Susanna N Visser et al, "Trends in the Parent-Report of Health Care Provider-Diagnosed
and Medicated Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: United States, 2003-2011" (2014) 53:1
J American Academy Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 34 at 39.
27. Ibid at 38. See also Alan Schwarz & Sarah Cohen, "ADHD. Seen i 11% of US Children as
Diagnoses Rise" New York Times (31 March 2013), online: <www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/health!
more-diagnoses-of-hypemctivity-causing-concem.html>
28. Visser et al, supra note 26 at 41.
29. Mark L Wolmich et al, "The Prevalence of ADHD: Its Diagnosis and Treatment in Four School
Districts across Two States" (2014) 18:7 J Attention Disorders 563; Kathleen Ries Merikangas et al,
"Lifetime Prevalence of Mental Disorders inU.S. Adolescents: Results from the National Comorbidity
Survey Replication-Adolescent Supplement (NCS-A)" (2010) 49:10 J American Academy Child &
Adolescent Psychiatry 980.
30. Leslie Montejano et al, "Adult ADHD: Prevalence of Diagnosis in a US Population with
Employer Health Insurance" (2011) 27:S2 Current Medical Research & Opinion 5 at 5.
31. Ibidat8-9.
Agonizing Identity in Mental Health Law and Policy 637
(Part I)
Another study (based in "national surveys of ambulatory care visits to
physicians' offices and outpatient and emergency departments of general
and short-stay hospitals")32 reports a threefold increase over the period
1996-2003. Prescription rates are also rising dramatically, with reports
of growth in the adult market outstripping the increase in childhood
prescriptions (one study reports an annual growth rate of 17 per cent for
men and 21.4 per cent for women aged 20-44 from 2000-2005).33
The trend toward increased prevalence of adult ADHD is likely to
accelerate in coming years. This is due in part to the fact that DSM-5,
which came out in 2013, has relaxed the diagnostic criteria for adults
34
while adding illustrative examples involving both teens and adults. This is
combined with an intensification of pharmaceutical industry marketing of
ADHD treatments directed at the adult market.
Allen Frances, who was chair of the Task Force that produced DSM-IV
(released in 1994), has been one of the most high-profile critics of DSM-5,
both the processes through which changes were made and the substance
of many of those changes. In a 2010 article in the Los Angeles Times,
he referred to DSM-5 as threatening to "extend the reach of psychiatry
dramatically deeper into the ever-shrinking domain of the normal."35
Following the release of DSM-5, Frances summed up his position on
his blog DSM5 in Distress as follows: "My best advice to clinicians, to
the press, and to the general public-be skeptical and don't follow DSM 5
blindly down a road likely to lead to massive over-diagnosis and harmful
over-medication.3 6 He outlined ten of what he deems the most egregious
changes adopted by DSM-5 ("the ten changes that make no sense"),
advising clinicians, the press, and the general public to "[j]ust ignore"
32. Richard H Weisler & David W Goodman, "Assessment and Diagnosis of Adult ADHD: Clinical
Challenges and Opportunities for Improving Patient Care" (2008) 15:11 Primary Psychiatry 53 at
54, citing Jayashri Sankaranarayanan, Susan E Puumala & Christopher J Kratochvil, "Diagnosis and
Treatment of Adult Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder at US Ambulatory Care Visits from 1996
to 2003" (2006) 22:8 Current Medical Research& Opinion 1475.
33. Lon Castle et al, "Trends in Medication Treatment for ADHD" (2007) 10:4 J Attention Disorders
335. See also Weisler & Goodman, supra note 32.
34. See, e.g., National Resource Center on AD/HD (a program of Children and Adults with
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder), "ADHD and the DSM 5," online: <www.help4adhd.org/
documents/adhd%/ 20and%/ 20the%/ 20dsm%/o2050% 20fact
0 
2Osheet%/o202.0.pdf>.
35. Allen Frances, "It's Not Too Late to Save 'Normal': Psychiatry's Latest DSM Goes Too Far
in Creating New Mental Disorders," Los Angeles Times (1 March 2010), online: <articles.latimes.
com!2010/mar/01/opinion/la-oe-francesl-2010mar0l>.
36. Allen J Frances, "DSM 5 Is Guide not Bible-Ignore Its Ten Worst Changes: APA Approval of
DSM-5 is a Sad Day for Psychiatry" (2 December 2012), DSM5 in Distress (blog), online: <www.
psychologytoday.conblog/dsm5-in-distress/201212/dsm-5-is-guide-not-bible-ignore-its-ten-worst-
changes>.
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them.37 His top ten are all either new diagnoses or expanded criteria for
assigning old diagnoses.
Frances's naughty list includes:
* Adult Attention Deficit Disorder (a subtype of Adult ADHD);
* Binge Eating Disorder ("[e]xcessive eating 12 times in 3 months,"
which after DSM-5 is "no longer just a manifestation of gluttony
and the easy availability of really great tasting food");
* Minor Neurocognitive Disorder ("the everyday forgetting
characteristic of old age," which, translated to a DSM diagnosis,
is likely to create "a huge false positive population of people who
are not at special risk for dementia");
* Major Depressive Disorder (revised to encompass what Frances
calls "[n]ormal grief ... thus medicalizing and trivializing our
expectable and necessary emotional reactions to the loss of a loved
one and substituting pills and superficial medical rituals for the
deep consolations of family, friends, religion, and the resiliency
that comes with time and the acceptance of the limitations of
life"); and,
* Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder (a new diagnosis aimed
at "vulnerable children," effectively "tum[ing] temper tantrums
into a mental disorder").
38
Frances is particularly scathing on the last-mentioned development, which
he briefly puts into context:
During the past two decades, child psychiatry has already provoked three
fads-a tripling of Attention Deficit Disorder, a more than twenty-times
increase in Autistic Disorder, and a forty-times increase in childhood
Bipolar Disorder. The field should have felt chastened by this sorry track
record and should engage itself now in the crucial task of educating
practitioners and the public about the difficulty of accurately diagnosing
children and the risks of over-medicating them.
39
Much of Frances's critique is directed at the conflict of interest that
inheres in the arrangement whereby psychiatrists (through the American
Psychiatric Association, which publishes and oversees the evolution of
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turf.4" As to his own role as lead on DSM-IV-under the sway of which
the cited increases in diagnosis of ADHD, Autism Spectrum Disorder,
and childhood Bipolar Disorder occurred-it is possible that Frances is
in denial. In his recent book, Saving Normal: An Insider's Revolt against
Out-ofControl Psychiatric Diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the
Medicalization of Ordinary Life, he lays the blame for overdiagnosis and
overmedication on rushed or undereducated practitioners, profit-hungry
pharmaceutical companies, and consumer susceptibility to hype and to the
promise of a quick fix.41 He stands by the diagnostic categories of DSM-
IV and the utility of these categories in alleviating individual suffering. In
short, Frances's mission is not to crack the epistemological foundations
of DSM, but to get back to basics: to distinguish the "true" illnesses from
the fads. Of course, that is the mission of all who have been at the helm of
DSM, and the controversy and friction among these designers of normal
may be considered part of the ongoing story of historical ontology.
It is a common criticism of the steep increases in diagnosis of and
prescriptions for childhood ADHD that parents and schools are failing to
address the root social and institutional causes of the behaviours labeled
aberrant or maladaptive in children. Broad systemic reforms-including
reforms aimed at making schools more conducive to the flourishing of
all students42-have been argued to constitute a more promising line of
inquiry and experimentation than the risky social experiment of marking
out one in ten kids (and rising) for medicalized (self) control.
But what of the adults? What, if any, societal reforms-at home, at
work, in our expectations of ourselves and others-might stave off the
onset/onslaught of Adult ADHD and the whole motley crew of other
malleable disorders, from the most faddish to the stickier kinds, the kinds
that fit so well you would think we were made for them?
40. Ibid (arguing that the psychiatrist members of the Task Force stand in "an intellectual, not
financial, conflict of interest that results from the natural tendency of highly specialized experts to
overvalue their pet ideas, to want to expand their own areas of research interest, and to be oblivious to
the distortions that occur in translating DSM 5 to real life clinical practice (particularly in primary care
where 80% of psychiatric drugs are prescribed)").On the exposure of a significant undisclosed financial
conflict of interest on the part of the Chair of the DSM-5 Task Force, see Allen Frances, "Holding
Psychiatry to a Much Higher Ethical Standard" (22 Jan 2014) The Blog: Huffington Post Science
(blog), online: <www.huffingtonpost.com/allen-frances/holding-psychiatry-to-a-m b 4641102.
html>.
41. Allen Frances, Saving Normal: An Insider's Revolt against Out-of-Control Psychiatric
Diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the Medicalization of Ordinary Life (New York: HarperCollins,
2013).
42. See AD Pellegrini & Michael Horvat, "A Developmental Contextualist Critique of Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder" (1995) 24:1 Educational Researcher 13.
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Back to my "diagnosis": my sham, junk diagnosis. I would like to say
it means nothing to me. And yet... I am just a little ADHD-curious. What
would it feel like to be on those mysterious attention-sorting stimulants?
Who might I become? What if-and here is the tenderest thought, the
one I contemplate with a short sharp pang (perceived deficit)-what if I
could teach better, could give perfectly timed and funny and impeccably
reasoned lectures; what if-circling ever closer to what I value most
among those matters most suffering attention deficit in the junk drawers of
my life-what if I were to finish the various papers abandoned in various
states of growth or amputation, perhaps even the dissertation ... polish
it up, produce a book? And still be home at a reasonable hour to make
wholesome dinners and play board games with my grateful and well-
cared-for children and spouse. Enjoying an endless parade of evenings
and weekends, free of work and yet anchored in meaningful work. Just
what value -apart from their street value-might those pills hold for me?
I am hovering between yes and no (I am quite sure the answer is no).
And while I hover, while I wobble, I ask myself: what does it mean to
undertake the critical ontology of ourselves, in the thick of biopower?
I consider the personal and social significance of psychiatric diagnosis,
and the various strands of identity-based claims made in relation to such
diagnoses. What, I ask, would be the implications of my claiming an
identity constituted in part through mental health/psychiatric disability-
the implications for my work, my family (my boys with their newly-minted
"ADHD genes"), my relationships with others who adopt one or another
form of disability-based identity in the arenas of mental health law and
policy? Not that anyone outside my immediate circle should care about
my individual passage through the tiny portal of ADHD. But what about
the rush of thousands upon thousands through t at same portal, or adjacent
ones? What does that mean for the politics of mental health identity, and
for mental health law and policy?
It would be ridiculous to believe that a one-minute self-test based in
questions about foot-wagging might wholly reconstitute my professional
and political identity. And yet the categories of mental health/psychiatric
disability are working on (and in) me, on and in all of us. They worked
me right into that consult, and worked me over. How else are these forces
working? And how should we respond? What relationship, if any, does
my experience of being outed as a squirmy six-year-old boy have to the
relationships of domination and subordination played out every day, every
minute of every day, in the arenas of mental health law and policy, along
a continuum that extends from the rawest physical violence to more subtle
colonization? I may stand in solidarity with those who place their survivor
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identity, or Mad identity, at the heart of their mental health politics-
but my experience is no ticket to a radicalized or otherwise politically
recognizable identity. It is more of an irritation, an irritating invitation to
reflect further on my and others' constitution through the categories of
order/disorder expressed through psychiatry and in the arenas of mental
health law and policy.
3. Phantasms (the spectral between worlds)
My sense of solidarity with those who have had identification under the
sign of psychiatric disability forced upon them is, in a word, spectral. It is
neither here nor there. This parallels the spectral solidarity I feel with my
birth mother, from whom I received two brief letters over two decades ago
(I never met her, although she visited my city and circled my block a few
weeks before she died): a woman who, I am told, wrestled bravely with
her demons and with her zealous father; who cut herself when she was
young-she was a cutter; who bore me in secret at age 17, and, less than
a year later, started a vaguely mystical women's collective at Harvard; a
woman who "struggled with bipolar disorder all her life." If I am going
to inherit a disorder, let it be hers-give me a bold cup of that woman's
mania-inclined bipolarity over ADHD (fucking ADHD) any day. Perhaps
it might open up a direct line between us, a humming, crackling current,
a means of listening in as "the ghost of electricity howls in the bones of
her[/my] face ."
43
That is to say it is as if my present position in relation to mental
health identity hovers spectre-like between worlds. This I experience less
through the language of psychiatry than through a symbolic language
reflecting the deep reach of dualistic psy-logics into my own defining
assumptions and relationships-reflecting, also, a will to get beyond
those disciplinary logics. On the one side of this symbolic divide is my
unconditionally loving, savvy, brick-solid sane social mother to whom I
owe everything; on the other is my absent, Mad mother. On the one side
is my mild-mannered, academically overachieving childhood self, on the
other is my ridiculously charismatic (like me, adopted) brother, one of
the pioneering Canadian children given Ritalin back in the early 1970s
for what was termed hyperactivity. On the one side is, again, me (now
just a little bit edgier, exploring my newly-sprung adult life); on the other
is my much edgier first boyfriend, who after a few years spiraled into a
psychosis so-called (the terms kept changing) and started acting in ways
43. Bob Dylan, "Visions of Johanna," Blonde on Blonde (Columbia Records, 1966).
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that so scared and angered me I eventually had just enough reasons (these
were not the only reasons) to leave my home province for good.
And then the two sides begin to blur-fast forward a little and I am
a few years older, still young, now struggling to express and to contain a
flying-apart of self I have learned to manage through a fixation on the limits
of my body, my borders-eating, vomiting, repetitively and ritualistically
as if working out a thesis about self-alienation and reconciliation, self-
present plenitude and present absence, sacred and profane. This was a
time of my life I experienced as a kind of sacrament: a time out of time.
It is not a time or a part of my "identity" that I connect to my work in
mental health law and policy. That story and the others resist coding in
singular or monological terms-on one side or the other of the poles of
identity and difference, order and disorder, normal and mad. I do not feel
at home in a world that forces a choice of sides. If I have a choice about
the constitution of my identity then I choose to hold on to all its unruly
dimensions, to reject a master code for their sorting and preferencing.
The spectral identity floats beyond the poles, not leaving them behind but
reflecting on their provisionality.
II. Toward a political taxonomy ofpsychiatric subjectifcation
This has been the first part of a two-part essay exploring identity in mental
health law and policy. In it, I have suggested two variations on the concern
that mental health identity is getting in the way of social justice. First is the
worry that the increasingly intensive emphasis on mental health in social
and political discourse (as mental illness comes "out of the shadows at
last")44 may, despite the rootedness of this development in a will to redress
real and often overlooked forms of suffering, paradoxically promote
a corrosive individualizing ethic whereby failure to thrive is reduced
to personal dysfunction, and the deeper social-structural dimensions of
injustice are pressed further back into the shadows. The second, attendant
worry is that mental health identification, deployed as revaluated currency
in the market of social justice claims-making, may function to perpetuate
the deep binary logic of norm and deviation, whereby madness and its
correlates are reflexively linked with incapacity and dangerousness and so
set off for heightened surveillance, intervention and containment.
44. Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Out of the
Shadows at Last: Transforming Mental Health, Mental Illness andAddition Services in Canada (May
2006) (Chair: The Honourable Michael JL Kirby). And see Kimberley White, "Out of the Shadows
and into the Spotlight: The Politics of (Jn)visibility and the Implementation of the Mental Health
Commission of Canada" in Kimberley White, ed, Configuring Madness: Representation, Context and
Meaning (Oxford, UK: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2009) 225.
Agonizing Identity in Mental Health Law and Policy 643
(Part I)
In Part II of this essay, I reflect in more detail on the categories of
mental health identification shaping the politics of mental health. I ask how
identity or identification-whether as mental health resistor or consumer
or liminal/critical interlocutor-sets the horizon of possibility for this
politics. I attend in particular to voices from the arenas of radicalized
mental health politics/Mad Studies, for insights on avoiding the pitfalls of
identity politics while strengthening solidarity and social justice critique
within and beyond this diversely-constituted social movement. These
insights are, I suggest, illustrative of agonistic pluralism, or of the work of
agonizing (mental health) identity as a necessary component of the critical
ontology of ourselves, and moreover, of political and legal legitimacy. I note
in particular the call, within these emerging models of social movement
building, for a co-engagement of academic and experiential expertise on
the way to new critical-deliberative conversations. Part II thus ends by
opening the project of critical ontology onto the coordinate project of a
critical-deliberative politics of agonizing identity in and beyond mental
health law and policy.

